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Inference to the Best Explanation Made Incoherent 
 
Abstract Defenders of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) claim that explanatory factors 
should play an important role in empirical inference. They disagree, however, about how exactly to 
formulate this role. In particular, they disagree about whether to formulate IBE as an inference rule for 
full beliefs or for degrees of belief, and, if it is formulated as a rule for degrees of belief, how this rule 
relates to Bayesianism. In this essay I advance a new argument against non-Bayesian versions of IBE 
that arises when we are concerned with multiple levels of explanation of some phenomenon. I show that 
in many such cases, following IBE as an inference rule for full belief leads to deductively inconsistent 
beliefs, and following IBE as a non-Bayesian updating rule for degrees of belief leads to 
(synchronically) probabilistically incoherent degrees of belief. 
 
 Proponents of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) claim that our inferences should give 
explanatory considerations a central role. Beyond this general agreement, however, they have differed 
on precisely how explanation should inform inference. A particular area of controversy has been the 
relation of IBE to Bayesianism. Should IBE be formulated in terms of full beliefs, as in traditional 
epistemology, or in terms of degrees of belief, as in Bayesian epistemology? If it is formulated in the 
latter way, is it compatible with Bayesian epistemology? 
In this essay I advance a new argument against non-Bayesian formulations of IBE. This includes 
both traditional formulations of IBE in terms of full belief and non-Bayesian formulations of IBE in 
terms of degrees of belief. I show that in some instances, IBE for full belief licenses deductively 
inconsistent inferences from the same evidence. In similar instances, following non-Bayesian IBE 
updating rules for degrees of belief leads to probabilistically incoherent credences. 
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In section I, I present the problem for traditional formulations of IBE in terms of full belief. In 
section II, I present the problem for non-Bayesian formulations of IBE in terms of degrees of belief. In 
section III, I consider some possible responses on behalf of the proponent of these formulations. Finally, 
in section IV, I conclude with some reflections on what a Bayesian form of IBE could look like. 
 
I.  IBE for Full Belief 
 Traditionally, proponents of IBE have formulated it in terms of full belief, or in terms of similar 
binary notions like acceptance. The most common formulation of IBE is that suggested by the phrase, 
‘inference to the best explanation’: it is a procedure on which, if H is the best explanation of E, one 
infers that H is true. This formulation is endorsed by the following authors: 
In making this inference [i.e., in inferring to the best explanation] one infers, from the fact that a 
certain hypothesis would explain the evidence, to the truth of that hypothesis. In general, there 
will be several hypotheses which might explain the evidence, so one must be able to reject all 
such alternative hypotheses before one is warranted in making the inference. Thus one infers, 
from the premise that a given hypothesis would provide a “better” explanation for the evidence 
than would any other hypothesis, to the conclusion that the given hypothesis is true (Harman 
1965: 89). 
Inference to the best explanation is the procedure of choosing the hypothesis or theory that best 
explains the available data (Vogel 1998). 
IBE authorises the acceptance of a hypothesis 𝐻, on the basis that it is the best explanation of the 
evidence (Psillos 2004: 83, italics omitted). 
IBE can be written as follows: It is reasonable to believe that the best available explanation of 
any fact is true (Musgrave 2009: 17, italics omitted). 
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[In inference to the best explanation,] one concludes that something is the case on the grounds 
that this best explains something else one believes to be the case (Greco 2015: 510). 
 It is obvious that this form of IBE can lead to inconsistent conclusions when applied multiple 
times to different items of evidence. For example, one hypothesis may best explain evidence E1, whereas 
an inconsistent hypothesis may best explain additional evidence E2. One might have thought, however, 
that IBE cannot lead to inconsistent conclusions when applied to the same evidence, so that we can 
avoid inconsistency by only drawing inferences from our total evidence (e.g., E1&E2). Against this, I 
will now show that in some cases the above form of IBE can license inconsistent inferences from the 
same evidence. 
My argument is based on the following fact about human reasoning: we offer and search for 
explanations at multiple levels. We can, with equal propriety, explain the presence of a trait in a 
biological population by positing that its members possess a gene which has been known to lead to that 
trait in similar organisms, or by telling a story about how that trait helped the population’s ancestors 
survive and reproduce. We can explain the invasion of one country by another by appealing to the 
beliefs and desires of the politicians of the invading country, current geopolitical factors, or historical 
tensions between the countries. Some explanations we offer or consider are more distal, some more 
proximate; some are more local, some more global; but all these types of explanations are generally 
recognized as legitimate, and they are all types which we might be interested in inferring from the data 
available to us. Although explanations at multiple levels of explanation may conflict, they need not: the 
above explanations of the biological trait and national invasion could all be true.
1
 
                                                             
1 Peter Lipton makes a similar point, saying that in cases like those I have described, “in spite of the suggestion of uniqueness 
that the word ‘best’ carries, Inference to the Best Explanation should be construed so as to allow multiple explanations” 
(Lipton 2004: 62-63). 
4 
 
However, in cases where explanations at multiple levels are not compatible, IBE can license 
inconsistent inferences from the same data. Consider a case in which I tell you the following. I have four 
urns with the following contents: 
U1 = 4 white balls 
U2 = 2 black balls, 2 white balls 
U3 = 3 black balls, 1 white balls 
U4 = 4 black balls 
I am going to set one of these urns in front of you and you are going to draw a ball from it. I will select 
the urn by flipping a coin twice. If it lands heads the first time, I will flip it again to select between U1 
and U4. If it lands tails the first time, I will flip it again to select between U2 and U3.  
 In this case, we have the following two partitions of possibilities:
2
 {U1, U2, U3, U4} and {Heads, 
Tails} (where the latter corresponds to the outcome of the first coin flip). We also have the following 
equivalencies: 
Heads = U1vU4 
Tails = U2vU3 
Now suppose that I flip the coin twice, and set the chosen urn in front of you. I do not tell you 
which urn is in front of you or the outcome of the coin flip. Your job is to infer that information by 
sampling from the urn. You do so, and draw out a black ball. What should you conclude? 
According to the simple version of IBE, you should infer the best explanation of your drawing 
black. What is the best explanation of this? If we are concerned with the question of which urn is in 
front of you, U4 is the best explanation, for that urn has only black balls; and U4 does not start out any 
more or less plausible than the other urn hypotheses. However, if we are concerned with the question of 
                                                             
2 A partition {H1, …, Hn} is a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive alternatives. 
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whether I flipped heads or tails, Tails is the better explanation. This is because Tails makes it more 
likely that you would draw black than does Heads; and neither Heads nor Tails is initially more or less 
plausible than the other.  
More formally, these judgments about explanation follow from the following principle about the 
conditions under which one hypothesis better explains the evidence than another: 
(1) If H1 and H2 are both potential explanations of E, P(H1) = P(H2), and P(E|H1) > P(E|H2), then 
H1 explains E better than H2. 
What (1) says is that if two potential explanations of the evidence start out equally credible and one 
makes the evidence more likely, that one explains the evidence better.  
In the case at hand, 
P(Heads) = P(Tails), 
and  
P(Black|Tails) = 5/8 > P(Black|Heads) = 1/2. 
Likewise,  
P(U1) = P(U2) = P(U3) = P(U4) = 1/4,  
and  
P(Black|U4) = 1 > P(Black|U3) = 3/4 > P(Black|U2) = 1/2 > P(Black|U1) = 0.  
Hence, by (1), Tails explains Black better than Heads, and U4 explains Black better than U3 or U2. As 
such, the simplest form of IBE would direct you to infer both U4 and Tails. However, U4 and Tails are 
inconsistent. So, this form of IBE leads to deductively inconsistent beliefs in this case. 
Many proponents of IBE have offered more sophisticated versions of the view as applied to full 
belief. For example, Kuipers (1984, 1992; see also Douven 2011: section 2) has defended a version of 
IBE on which, given a set of candidate explanations {H1,…, Hn} of E, one infers, not that the best 
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explanation of E among those is true, but that it is the closest to the truth of these hypotheses. 
This version of IBE will lead to inconsistent beliefs about the closeness to truth of the hypotheses 
in the present case. Exactly one of {Heads, Tails} is true and exactly one of {U1, U2, U3, U4} is true. 
Tails is closer to the truth than Heads just in case Tails is true. If Tails is true, one of U2 or U3 is closer 
to the truth than U4, because one of U2 or U3 is, simply, true. Hence, if one’s belief that Tails is closer to 
the truth than Heads is true, one’s belief that U4 is closer to the truth than the other urn hypotheses is 
false. Conversely, if U4 is closer to the truth than the other urn hypotheses, that is because it is, simply, 
true; and in this case Heads is closer to the truth than Tails, because Heads is true and Tails is false.
3
 
Other philosophers have argued that we should only infer to the best explanation when that 
explanation is satisfactory or good enough (Musgrave 1988, Lipton 1993 and 2004: 151-63; see also 
Douven 2011: section 2). Because of the imprecision of the notion of ‘good enough,’ it is hard to tell 
whether this version of IBE would license inference to both U4 and Tails in the above case. Suppose that 
it does not, however. It is plausible that the requirement that H be a good enough explanation of E is not 
going to rule out the above kind of scenario more generally unless it always implies that, given E, H is 
more probable than not. In the above scenario, P(U4|Black) = 4/9.
4
 So U4 is less probable than not even 
                                                             
3 Most theories of closeness to the truth, including Kuiper’s (1992), combine a “truth factor” with a “content factor.” (For an  
overview of such theories, see Oddie 2016.) Roughly speaking, the truth factor measures how close a proposition comes to 
being true, whereas the content factor measures how informative a proposition is. The idea in combining these is that we are 
interested in how close a proposition is to the whole truth; and (other things equal) informative propositions come closer to 
the whole truth than uninformative propositions (e.g., tautologies). In the above paragraph I focused solely on the truth factor. 
In the example at hand, however, Heads and Tails are equally informative, and the urn hypotheses are equally informative. 
As such, the only thing that makes a difference to how close each one is to the truth is how close they are to being true – i.e., 
the truth factor. 
4 See the application of Bayes’ rule to the urn hypotheses in section II for this calculation. 
7 
 
after you draw Black. More generally, A and B can only be inconsistent if one of them has a probability 
less than or equal to .5. 
Requiring that P(H|E) > .5, however, will not preclude inconsistent beliefs in scenarios with 
more than two levels of explanations. To demonstrate this, I will now describe a case with three levels of 
explanation, in which the best explanations at each level each have posterior probability 2/3 and yet are 
mutually inconsistent. 
Here is the case. A jury is deliberating about the killing of Mr. Boddy in the Study with the 
Revolver. The jury is trying to answer three questions: (a) who is the killer? (b) what was the motive? 
and (c) was the killing planned? We have the following three partitions corresponding to these 
questions: {Plum, Green}, {Defense, Money}, and {Planned, ~Planned}. Let E be the evidence that 
Boddy was killed with the revolver. Suppose that (before learning E) the jury’s background knowledge 
imposes the probability distribution on which P(Green&Money&~Planned&~E) = 
P(Plum&Defense&~Planned&E) = P(Plum&Money&Planned&E) = P(Green&Defense&Planned&E) = 
1/4. Where each quadrant has probability 1/4, their probability distribution can be represented as 
follows: 
Green&Money&~Planned&~E Plum&Defense&~Planned&E 
Plum&Money&Planned&E Green&Defense&Planned&E 
So, 
P(E|Plum) = P(E|Defense) = P(E|Planned) = 1  
> P(E|Green) = P(E|Money) = P(E|~Planned) = 1/2, 
 
P(Plum) = P(Green) = P(Defense) = P(Money) = P(Planned) = P(~Planned) = 1/2, 
P(Plum|E) = P(Defense|E) = P(Planned|E) = 2/3. 
In other words, Plum (but not Green) would definitely use the revolver, the killer would 
definitely use the revolver in self-defense (but might use another weapon for money), and a 
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premeditated homicide (but not a spontaneous one) would definitely be committed with the revolver. 
But Plum would not plan to kill someone in self-defense. (Green might, for some reason – perhaps 
Green had antecedent reason to believe that Boddy was out to get him.) So in this case, that Plum did it, 
that it was in self-defense, and that the killing was planned are all better explanations of the killer using 
the revolver than their rivals. In addition, all have posterior probabilities above .5. Nevertheless, these 
explanations are inconsistent, and P(Plum&Defense&Planned|E) = 0. 
If we raise the probabilistic threshold implied by “H is a good enough explanation of E” above 
2/3, then we can rule out the explanations being good enough in the above case. But by adding in further 
levels of explanation, we can devise a case of the above sort for any threshold that falls short of 1. I 
conclude that adding to our explanationist inference rule the requirement that H be a good enough 
explanation of E will not preclude the same evidence from warranting inconsistent inferences in some 
cases.
5
 
 
II.  IBE for Degrees of Belief 
In a series of essays, Igor Douven, Sylvia Wenmackers, and Jonah Schupbach have explored a 
particular version of IBE, which I will, following Douven and Wenmackers forthcoming, call IBE*. 
IBE* is a non-Bayesian updating rule that gives “bonus” points to more explanatory hypotheses. 
IBE* was first discussed, albeit in a less precise form, by van Fraassen (1989: ch. 7, section 4), 
who argued that an agent who follows IBE* will end up with diachronically incoherent credences. Van 
Fraassen took this to show that IBE and Bayesianism are incompatible. While not endorsing IBE* as the 
                                                             
5 One might argue that cases with more than two levels of explanation are less troubling inasmuch as the lottery and preface 
paradoxes already show that deductive inconsistency is sometimes rationally permissible for larger sets of beliefs. I consider 
this response in section III.4. 
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only reasonable explication of IBE, Douven (1999, 2013) subsequently argued that this incompatibility 
does not refute IBE* as a legitimate updating rule, contending that explanationists can adopt IBE* and 
nevertheless defend themselves against van Fraassen’s diachronic Dutch book argument as well as 
Leitgeb and Pettigrew’s (2010) inaccuracy-minimisation argument. More recently, Douven, 
Wenmackers, and Schupbach have argued that IBE* is more attractive than Bayes’ rule in certain 
respects, including speed of convergence to the truth (Douven 2013), performance in a social setting 
(Douven and Wenmackers forthcoming), and accuracy as a description of people’s actual probabilistic 
updating (Douven and Schupbach 2015a, 2015b). 
The discussions of IBE* in Douven 1999 and 2013 focus on objections to IBE* that turn on its 
leading to diachronically incoherent credences. In this section I show that in some cases using IBE* to 
update on new evidence leads to synchronic as well as diachronic incoherence. IBE* is thus not only 
“non-Bayesian” in that it violates Bayesian conditionalization; it is non-probabilist in that it violates the 
requirement that an agent’s credences be probabilities. In addition, we will see that other non-Bayesian 
formulations of IBE for degrees of beliefs, including ones suggested by Douven (2016) as alternatives to 
IBE*, have this same consequence. 
To see how IBE* works, consider updating your credences about my coin flip in the original urn 
case. We have the following possibilities: 
U1 = 4 white balls 
U2 = 2 black balls, 2 white balls 
U3 = 3 black balls, 1 white ball 
U4 = 4 black balls 
Heads = U1vU4 
Tails = U2vU3 
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You have drawn a black ball from the urn. What should your new credence that tails was flipped be? 
According to Bayes’ rule (also called Bayesian conditionalization),6 where Cr(Tails) is your 
original credence that the coin landed tails, and Crnew(Tails) is your credence that it landed tails after 
updating,
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𝐶𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠) = 𝐶𝑟(𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠│𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘) =
𝐶𝑟(𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠)𝐶𝑟(𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘│𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠)
𝐶𝑟(𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠)𝐶𝑟(𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘│𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠) + 𝐶𝑟(~𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠)𝐶𝑟(𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘│~𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠)
=
(
1
2) (
5
8)
(
1
2) (
5
8) + (
1
2) (
1
2)
=
5
16
5
16 +
1
4
=
5
16
9
16
=
5
9
≈ .56 
More generally, where {H1, … Hn} is a partition of hypotheses, Bayes’ rule says that 
𝐶𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝐻𝑖) = 𝐶𝑟(𝐻𝑖│𝐸) =
𝐶𝑟(𝐻𝑖)𝐶𝑟(𝐸│𝐻𝑖)
∑ [𝐶𝑟(𝐻𝑗)𝐶𝑟(𝐸│𝐻𝑗)]𝑗
 
According to IBE*, by contrast, 
𝐶𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝐻𝑖) =
𝐶𝑟(𝐻𝑖)𝐶𝑟(𝐸│𝐻𝑖) + 𝑓(𝐻𝑖 , 𝐸)
∑ [𝐶𝑟(𝐻𝑗)𝐶𝑟(𝐸│𝐻𝑗) + 𝑓(𝐻𝑗 , 𝐸)]𝑗
 
f (Hi, E) is a function that assigns a non-negative bonus b to the hypothesis Hi that best explains the 
evidence, and 0 to all other hypotheses. (IBE* and Bayes’ rule are equivalent just in case this bonus is 
0.) If we set the bonus b to 1/8, then, given that Tails explains drawing black better than Heads, IBE* 
would calculate your new credence in the present case as follows: 
                                                             
6 Bayes’ rule should not be confused with Bayes’ theorem. The latter is a theorem of the probability calculus, and is not (or 
should not be) controversial. It is the second equality below, which expresses P(Heads|Black) as a function of P(Heads), 
P(Black|Heads), and P(Black|~Heads). The former is a philosophically controversial claim that says that an agent’s credence 
in H after getting evidence E should be equal to her former credence in H conditional on E. 
7 I switch from P(.) to Cr(.) here because I will be discussing some credence functions that are probabilistically incoherent, 
and hence are not probability functions. 
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𝐶𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠) =
𝐶𝑟(𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠)𝐶𝑟(𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘│𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠) +
1
8
𝐶𝑟(𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠)𝐶𝑟(𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘│𝑇𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠) + 𝐶𝑟(𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠)𝐶𝑟(𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘│𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠) +
1
8
=
5
16 +
2
16
9
16 +
2
16
=
7
11
≈ .64 
A parallel calculation for Crnew(Heads) would find that it is equal to 4/11, or approximately .36. 
 What about the urn hypotheses? According to Bayes’ rule, your new credence in U4 is: 
𝐶𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝑈4) =
𝐶𝑟(𝑈4)𝐶𝑟(𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘│𝑈4)
∑ [𝐶𝑟(𝑈𝑖)𝐶𝑟(𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘│𝑈𝑖)]𝑖
=
(
1
4) (1)
(
1
4) (0) + (
1
4) (
1
2) + (
1
4) (
3
4) + (
1
4) (1)
=
4
16
9
16
=
4
9
 ≈ .44 
Similar calculations would show that Crnew(Heads) = 4/9, Crnew(U1) = 0, Crnew(U2) = 2/9, and Crnew(U3) 
= 3/9. Note that given Black, Tails (= U2vU3) and U4 are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, and 
so your credences in them rightly sum to 1. 
However, according to IBE*, given that U4 is the best urn-explanation of your draw, and setting 
b at 1/8,
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𝐶𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝑈4) =
𝐶𝑟(𝑈4)𝐶𝑟(𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘│𝑈4) + 𝑓(𝑈4, 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘)
∑ [𝐶𝑟(𝑈𝑖)𝐶𝑟(𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘│𝑈𝑖) + 𝑓(𝑈𝑖 , 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘)]𝑖
=
4
16 +
2
16
9
16 +
2
16
=
6
11
≈ .55 
Similar calculations show that Crnew(U1) = 0, Crnew(U2) = 2/11, and Crnew(U3) = 3/11. 
 The problem is now easy to see. You know that Heads is true iff U4 is. However, you assign 
them different credences: you are more confident than not that the fourth urn was picked, but less 
confident than not that heads was flipped. This is probabilistically incoherent.
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8 Any non-zero bonus will result in incoherence for the same reason. I choose 1/8 for ease of computation. 
9 IBE* will also lead to incoherence in the Mr. Boddy case. If Plum, Defense, and Planned all receive an explanatory bonus, 
then Crnew(Plum) > 2/3, Crnew(Defense) > 2/3, and Crnew(Planned) > 2/3. If the jury’s new credences are coherent, this implies 
that  
Crnew(Plum&Money&Planned) + Crnew(Plum&Defense&~Planned) > 2/3, 
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 So far I have only considered IBE* as a non-Bayesian version of IBE for degrees of belief. 
Douven (2016) considers a more general schema of non-Bayesian forms of IBE of which IBE* is a 
special case: 
𝐶𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝐻𝑖) =
𝐶𝑟(𝐻𝑖)𝐶𝑟(𝐸│𝐻𝑖 ) + 𝑐 × 𝐶𝑟(𝐻𝑖)𝐶𝑟(𝐸│𝐻𝑖)𝑚(𝐻𝑖 , 𝐸)
∑ [𝐶𝑟(𝐻𝑗)𝐶𝑟(𝐸│𝐻𝑗) + 𝑐 × 𝐶𝑟(𝐻𝑗)𝐶𝑟(𝐸│𝐻𝑗)𝑚(𝐻𝑗 , 𝐸)]𝑗
 
Here c ∈ [0, 1] is a constant and m ∈ [-1, 1] is a formal measure of how well Hi explains E. The main 
difference between this schema and the more specific IBE* is that this schema assigns explanatory 
bonuses and penalties to all hypotheses, whereas IBE* only assigns a bonus to the most explanatory 
hypothesis. The constant c determines how much weight is given to explanatory considerations 
compared to the weight carried by the priors and likelihoods; a higher value gives explanatory 
considerations greater weight. 
 In our urn case, this general schema will lead to incoherent results given that c > 0, m(Heads, 
Black) < m(Tails, Black), m(U2, Black) < m(U4, Black), and m(U3, Black) < m(U4, Black) – i.e., given 
that some extra weight is given to explanatory considerations, and given that Tails is counted as a better 
explanation than Heads and U4 is counted as a better explanation than U2 or U3. To see this, note that 
Crnew(Heads) = Crnew(U4) = 4/9 if c = 0 (in which case this rule reduces to Bayes’ rule). If c > 0, then the 
new credence in Tails will be lower, because Tails gets a lower explanatory bonus than Heads, and so 
after normalizing (by dividing by the denominator) so that Crnew(Heads) + Crnew(Tails) = 1, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Crnew(Plum&Defense&~Planned) + Crnew(Green&Defense&Planned) > 2/3, 
and 
Crnew(Plum&Money&Planned) + Crnew(Green&Defense&Planned) > 2/3. 
But this implies that 
Crnew(Plum&Money&Planned) + Crnew(Plum&Defense&~Planned) + Crnew(Green&Defense&Planned) > 1,  
which is incoherent. 
13 
 
Crnew(Heads) < 4/9. Likewise, the new credence in U4 will be higher, because U4 gets a bigger 
explanatory bonus than U2 and U3; hence, Crnew(U4) > 4/9. But this is probabilistically incoherent, 
because Heads and U4 are equivalent after drawing Black, and so must have equal probabilities. So we 
can only avoid incoherence by setting c equal to 0, which reduces this schema to Bayes’ rule. 
Setting aside the particular schema above, the general problem that I have identified will remain 
for any credence update rule that gives “bonuses” to explanatorily better hypotheses. Any ranking of 
explanatory goodness that satisfies (1) will sometimes rank hypotheses at different levels of explanation 
in ways that lead to inconsistency if explanatory hypotheses get bonuses beyond those already given by 
likelihoods. This is because the hypothesis ranked best at one level of explanation will not necessarily be 
consistent with the hypothesis ranked best at another level of explanation. 
  
III.  Responses 
 I have argued that when we are considering potential explanations of the available evidence at 
multiple levels, following non-Bayesian versions of IBE can lead to either deductive inconsistency or 
probabilistic incoherence. In this section I want to consider four responses on behalf of the defender of 
these versions of IBE. The first response is to deny my claims about which explanations are better in the 
cases I have described. The second response is that we should not infer or update beliefs or credences in 
atomic hypotheses of the kind I have considered here, but rather in complete world-states. The third 
response is that the kind of situation I have described is not widespread enough for my argument to 
undermine most applications of IBE.  The fourth response is to give up deductive consistency and 
probabilistic coherence as rational requirements on beliefs and credences. 
1. Denying (1) 
 The most straightforward objection to my initial urn case is that I was wrong to assume that U4 is 
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a better explanation of Black than U2 or U3 or that Tails is a better explanation of Black than Heads. 
(Analogous remarks go for the Mr. Boddy case; I will focus on the urn case in what follows.) All I have 
shown, so the objection goes, is that one of these claims about explanatory goodness must be false. I 
noted in section I that these claims about explanatory goodness follow from 
(1) If H1 and H2 are both potential explanations of E, P(H1) = P(H2), and P(E|H1) > P(E|H2), then 
H1 explains E better than H2. 
The defender of this first objection must thus deny (1). 
 In the course of defending the descriptive adequacy of IBE*, Douven and Schupbach (2015a: 3-
4) consider formalizations of the notion of explanatory goodness employed in IBE* in terms of several 
proposed probabilistic measures of explanatory power (see, e.g., Schupbach 2011, Schupbach and 
Sprenger 2011, Crupi and Tentori 2012). All of these measures imply that 
(2) If H1 and H2 are both potential explanations of E, P(H1) = P(H2), and P(E|H1) > P(E|H2), then 
H1 is a more powerful explanation of E than H2. 
In fact, they all imply something stronger than (2), namely that 
(3) If H1 and H2 are both potential explanations of E and P(E|H1) > P(E|H2), then H1 is a more 
powerful explanation of E than H2.
10
  
 If explanatory goodness = explanatory power, then (1) and (2) are equivalent. Hence, if we 
formalize explanatory goodness in terms of one of the proposed measures of explanatory power in the 
literature, then we must accept (1). We must also accept the stronger claim that 
(4) If H1 and H2 are both potential explanations of E and P(E|H1) > P(E|H2), then H1 explains E 
                                                             
10 Most discussions of these measures take for granted even stronger axioms than (3) as conditions of adequacy for a measure 
of explanatory power. (2) is thus much weaker than the assumptions usually made by philosophers discussing formal 
measures of explanatory power. 
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better than H2. 
However, one might hold that there are other explanatory virtues besides explanatory power, such as 
informativeness and fruitfulness. So, H1 might be a more powerful explanation of E than H2 and yet still 
be a worse overall explanation. 
 However, even if one thought that (1) might be false in cases where, say, H2 was more 
informative or fruitful than H1, the urn case is not such a case. The different coin hypotheses and the 
different urn hypotheses are symmetrical: not only do they have equal prior probabilities, they are the 
same kinds of hypotheses, about the same kinds of objects, saying the same kinds of things. None are ad 
hoc. All appear equally informative, fruitful, etc. There seem to be no substantive differences among 
them except for the degree to which they predict the evidence. In such a case, it is very difficult to deny 
that the hypothesis which predicts the evidence more strongly is the better explanation of that evidence. 
Rejecting the above judgments about which explanations are better is thus not an attractive option. 
I should note that, although they do not consider examples like those above, Douven and 
Wenmackers (forthcoming: 6) do attempt to preclude the possibility of cases in which IBE* leads to 
probabilistic incoherence by making a formal assumption about the explanatory bonus function f (H, E): 
[I]t is safe to assume that, for all E, f (H, E) = 0 whenever H is a tautology or a contradiction. If 
we make the further formal assumption that, for all E, f (HvH*, E) = f (H, E) + f (H*, E) 
whenever H and H* are mutually exclusive, then it is easy to prove that updating a probability 
function via IBE* leads again to a probability function.
11
 
                                                             
11 As stated, these two assumptions are inconsistent. By the first assumption, f (Hv~H, E) = 0. But by the second assumption, 
f (Hv~H, E) = f (H, E) + f (~H, E). But if f (H, E) is non-zero, then these two equalities are inconsistent. In correspondence, 
Douven has suggested that he and Wenmackers should have added the condition that H and H* are not jointly exhaustive. 
Alternatively, they could limit the first assumption to contradictions alone. This is because applying IBE* will give Crnew(H) 
value 1 for any value of f, if Cr(H) = 1. Both of these fixes have odd consequences – the latter assigns an “explanatory bonus” 
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The urn example violates this second assumption. Your background knowledge implies that Heads is 
materially equivalent to U1vU4. But 
f (Heads, Black) = 0 ≠ f (U1, Black) + f (U4, Black) = 0 + 1 = 1. 
However, since, as I have argued, it is clear that U4 is the best explanation among the urn hypotheses 
and Tails is the best explanation among the coin hypotheses, it follows that the second assumption above 
is not a tenable constraint on f if f is a function which assigns a bonus to the best explanation of the 
evidence. 
2. World-States 
The above inconsistency arose because we were considering two different partitions of 
hypotheses, at different levels of explanation. If we could ensure that we only consider one partition, 
there would be no room for a conflict to arise. The easiest way to do this would be to have an agent 
directly update her beliefs/credences over the partition of complete world-states by IBE, with her new 
beliefs/credences over world-states imposing beliefs/credences over other partitions. Here a world-state 
is a conjunction such that, for every atomic partition of possibilities in an agent’s language explanatorily 
prior to the observed evidence, the world-state contains one member of each partition as a conjunct. For 
example, in the original urn scenario, if the atomic partitions prior to the observed evidence Black are 
{Heads, Tails} and {U1, U2, U3, U4}, then there are four world-states consistent with your background 
knowledge: 
{Heads&U1, Heads&U4, Tails&U2, Tails&U3}. 
It follows from (4) that Heads&U4 is the best explanation of Black among these hypotheses. So, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
(albeit a vacuous one) to tautologies, and the former makes f discontinuous in the limit. But, because they make no practical 
difference to credence assignments, neither of these problems seem as serious to me as the inconsistency of the second 
assumption with our explanatory judgments in the urn case. 
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if you are fully inferring to the best explanation, then the current proposal would have you infer that 
Heads&U4 is true. You will then believe each of these conjuncts individually as well. If you are 
updating your credences, then Heads&U4 will receive the explanatory boost among the members of this 
partition. Your other new credences could then be determined by your new credence distribution over 
this partition, as in a standard probability function: any sentence in an agent’s language is equivalent to a 
disjunction of world-states, and so its probability can be determined by adding the probabilities assigned 
to those world-states. 
I have three objections to this strategy for resolving the problem. The first is that it is impossible 
to apply in actual reasoning. Outside of idealized thought experiments like the ones under discussion 
here, an agent could not even formulate a world-state, let alone assign a probability to it. In real life we 
rarely consider partitions of complex conjunctions of multiple hypotheses, but instead consider 
partitions of different atomic or near-atomic propositions. 
A second problem for this response is that a maximally specific description of the world is not 
the kind of thing we would tend to think of as a good explanation. Usually when we ask what explains 
some observed evidence, we are interested in much more specific hypotheses, and not a complete 
history of the universe. Applying IBE only to world-states is thus in tension with the spirit of IBE, which 
is usually understood to license inference to these much more specific explanations of the kinds we are 
ordinarily more interested in. 
Applying IBE only to world-states is in tension with the spirit of IBE for another reason. The 
core intuition behind IBE is that how well hypotheses explain the evidence is important for determining 
whether those hypotheses are true. However, inferring/boosting our credence in the world-state which 
best explains one’s evidence privileges the explanatory relation between world-states and the evidence 
at the expense of the explanatory relations between atomic propositions and the evidence, and among the 
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atomic propositions themselves. If the fact that Heads&U4 is the best explanation of Black among 
{Heads&U1, Heads&U4, Tails&U2, Tails&U3} gives us reason to infer/boost our credence in 
Heads&U4, it seems that the fact that Tails is the best explanation of Black among {Heads, Tails} should 
also give us reason to infer/boost our credence in Tails. But non-Bayesian versions of IBE cannot accept 
both of these claims. It would be preferable to have a version of IBE which can take into account the 
explanatory power of all hypotheses, and not just that of world-states. 
3. Limiting IBE 
In his 2016 Douven says that IBE is best thought of as a ‘slogan’ the correct spelling out of 
which depends on the situation. Another response the defender of IBE* and IBE for full belief could 
make would be to grant their inapplicability in the kind of case I have discussed, but to hold that they 
can still be applied in other cases – that in other cases, they are the best way to spell out the slogan of 
IBE.
12
 A fairly small restriction would be to hold that these forms of IBE can be applied when no 
hypotheses at different levels of explanation are inconsistent with each other, as Tails is inconsistent 
with U4. 
To see whether this restriction works, let us consider a revision of the original urn case. Now, if I 
flip heads the first time, instead of there being a probability of 0 of selecting U2 or U3, I will initiate a 
chance process that has a 1/100 probability of selecting U2 and a 1/100 probability of selecting U3, and 
distributes the remaining probability equally among U1 and U4. Similarly, if I flip tails, I will initiate a 
process that has a 1/100 probability of selecting U1 and a 1/100 probability of selecting urn U4, and 
distributes the remaining probability equally among U2 and U3. 
Let us first consider how problematic following IBE for full belief is in this case. It still follows 
                                                             
12 For example, in the case of IBE*, one might support this with the alleged advantages of IBE* discussed in the texts 
referenced at the beginning of section II. 
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from (1) that Tails is the best coin-explanation of drawing black, and U4 is the best urn-explanation. 
Since Tails and U4 are now logically consistent, inferring both of them does not give one deductively 
inconsistent beliefs. Nevertheless, Tails and U4 are extremely negatively relevant to each other. Even 
though neither is very initially unlikely on its own, the prior chance that both are true is only 1/200. That 
both are true is thus a surprising claim to be committed to by one’s inferring to the best explanation of 
drawing black. 
Moreover, the reason that Tails is the best coin-explanation of Black is in significant tension 
with U4. Tails is the best explanation of Black because it makes more likely U2vU3, which makes Black 
more likely than U1vU4. It would be very odd to infer that U4 because it explains Black well, and also 
infer that Tails is true because it explains Black well by making likely hypotheses that one is rejecting in 
inferring U4. As with the world-state revision considered above, inferring both of these would ignore the 
negative explanatory relation Tails and U4 bear toward each other in favor of the positive explanatory 
relations they individually bear toward Black. 
Finally, inferring to the best explanation in this but not the original urn case would commit us to 
a problematic discontinuity as we move from extreme negative relevance to logical inconsistency. 
Inconsistency is simply a limiting case of negative relevance, and it seems bad to allow the inference of 
two propositions as they get more and more negatively relevant to each other but disallow it as soon as 
they reach the point of inconsistency. 
As for IBE*, it still leads to incoherence even in this case. In this case, we have the following 
hypotheses and (initial) credences: 
U1 = the urn selected contains 4 white balls 
U2 = the urn selected contains 2 black balls, 2 white balls 
U3 = the urn selected contains 3 black balls, 1 white ball 
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U4 = the urn selected contains 4 black balls 
Cr(U1|Heads) = Cr(U4|Heads) = 49/100 
 Cr(U2|Heads) = Cr(U3|Heads) = 1/100 
Cr(U1|Tails) = Cr(U4|Tails) = 1/100 
 Cr(U2|Tails) = Cr(U3|Tails) = 49/100 
Cr(Black|Heads) = Cr(U1|Heads)Cr(Black|U1) + Cr(U2|Heads)Cr(Black|U2) + 
Cr(U3|Heads)Cr(Black|U3) + Cr(U4|Heads)Cr(Black|U4) = (49/100)(0) + (1/100)(1/2) + 
(1/100)(3/4) + (49/100)(1) = 1/200 + 3/400 + 49/100 = 201/400 = .5025 
Cr(Black|Tails) = Cr(U1|Tails)Cr(Black|U1) + Cr(U2|Tails)Cr(Black|U2) + 
Cr(U3|Tails)Cr(Black|U3) + Cr(U4|Tails)Cr(Black|U4) = (1/100)(0) + (49/100)(1/2) + 
(49/100)(3/4) + (1/100)(1) = 49/200 + 147/400 + 1/100 = 249/400 = .6225 
As noted above, it still follows from (1) that Tails is the best coin-explanation of drawing black, 
and U4 is the best urn-explanation. And if we consider the set of world-states {Heads&U1, Heads&U2, 
Heads&U3, Heads&U4, Tails&U1, Tails&U2, Tails&U3, Tails&U4}, it follows from (4) that Heads&U4 
and Tails&U4 are better explanations of Black than any of the other world-states. If we identify 
explanatory goodness with explanatory power, it will also follow from any of the measures of 
explanatory power mentioned earlier that Heads&U4 and Tails&U4 are equally good explanations, 
because they make the evidence equally probable. In such a case Douven and Wenmackers (2015: 6) say 
that Heads&U4 and Tails&U4 should split the explanatory bonus b equally, so that f (H&U4,B) = f 
(T&U4,B) = b/2. 
It then follows from IBE* that 
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If your new credence distribution is coherent, then Crnew(Heads) = Crnew(Heads&U1) + 
Crnew(Heads&U2) + Crnew(Heads&U3) + Crnew(Heads&U4). However,  
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iff b = 0. As such, your new credence distribution is coherent iff b = 0, in which case IBE* reduces to 
Bayes’ rule. So applying IBE* with a non-zero explanatory bonus in this new case still leads to 
incoherence.
13
 
                                                             
13 Douven’s more general schema will also lead to incoherence. It will give an explanatory penalty to Heads, thus lowering 
Crnew(Heads). However, it will give equal penalties/bonuses to Heads&U2 and Tails&U2, Heads&U3 and Tails&U3, and 
Heads&U4 and Tails&U4, respectively. (Crnew(Heads&U1) = Crnew(Tails&U1) = 0 no matter what.) This will increase the sum 
Crnew(Heads&U1) + Crnew(Heads&U2) + Crnew(Heads&U3) + Crnew(Heads&U4). 
This is because, without the bonus b, this sum is less than the sum  
Crnew(Tails&U1) + Crnew(Tails&U2) + Crnew(Tails&U3) + Crnew(Tails&U4), 
22 
 
Applying non-Bayesian forms of IBE remains problematic, then, even when two best 
explanations at different levels of explanation are merely negatively relevant to each other, and not 
inconsistent. So, if we are to only apply these forms of IBE to unproblematic cases, we must limit it to 
cases in which we are either not interested in multiple levels of explanation or in which the best 
explanations at different levels are not negatively relevant to each other. 
While I do not think my argument in this paper definitively rules out the viability of such a 
restriction, I do want to suggest two reasons to be wary of it. First, it would be preferable, other things 
equal, to have a unified inference form that we can use in all or most contexts. If we think that this 
inference form will be a version of IBE, we should then prefer a Bayesian explication of IBE (such as 
the one gestured at in section IV) that does not lead to inconsistency or incoherence in any cases. 
Second, the above restricted forms of IBE could arguably only rarely be applied, inasmuch as the 
phenomenon of reasoning about multiple levels of explanation is quite common. While the urn case is 
clearly a toy example, the Mr. Boddy example is fairly realistic (aside from the board game references). 
The jury on a normal homicide case really will be interested in not only the question of who the killer is, 
but also the circumstances surrounding the killing, such as the killer’s motives, which is a level of 
explanation up from the question of who the killer is. This information is important because a revenge 
killing, but not a self-defense killing, would constitute murder. In addition, if the killing does constitute 
murder the jury needs to know how severe a sentence the circumstances warrant, and so they need to 
determine whether the murder was premeditated. 
As another example, imagine a doctor observing particular symptoms, such as headaches and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
and adding the same quantity to two values makes their ratio closer to equal, thus making the normalized sum of the former 
credences higher. So  
Crnew(Heads) > Crnew(Heads&U1) + Crnew(Heads&U2) + Crnew(Heads&U3) + Crnew(Heads&U4), 
which is incoherent. 
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chest pain, in a patient. He considers certain physiological conditions which might cause these 
symptoms, such as high blood pressure and bronchitis. He further considers certain behavioral patterns 
which are likely to have caused these conditions, such as poor diet and smoking cigarettes. It is 
important that he determine the correct explanation at both these levels so as to best judge how to treat 
the condition the patient is most likely to have. 
Reasoning about multiple levels of explanation, then, is a familiar feature of ordinary life.
14
 One 
might still think that only rarely will the best explanations at different levels be negatively relevant to 
each other, so that we can still apply the above forms of IBE in most cases of reasoning about multiple 
levels of explanation. This is hard to assess from the armchair. But even if in many cases the best 
explanations at multiple levels will not be negatively relevant to each other, we will often not be able to 
tell this in advance of investigation. For example, we can imagine that as the doctor learns more he 
comes to conclude that the best physiological explanation of the patient’s headache is high blood 
pressure, the best behavioral explanation of high blood pressure is smoking, but smoking is not the best 
behavioral explanation of the patient’s headache. Inasmuch as we usually cannot rule out a situation like 
this in advance, we should be wary of using a rule which will run into trouble in such a situation. 
4. Giving up Consistency/Coherence 
I have argued that following non-Bayesian forms of IBE sometimes leads either to deductive 
inconsistency, in the case of IBE for full belief, or probabilistic incoherence, in the case of non-Bayesian 
                                                             
14 The kind of complexity present in multiple levels of explanation is really a specific form of the more general Quinean 
phenomenon in which all of our beliefs are connected. Formal epistemologists have largely neglected this phenomenon, 
perhaps because of the difficulty of formally representing it. In my own view, the best formal representation of this 
interconnectedness is found in the theory of Bayesian networks, developed by Judea Pearl (1988), and applied to 
epistemology by Bovens and Hartmann (2003) and Henderson et al. (2010). These texts all contain further examples of 
empirical and scientific reasoning which is concerned with more than one level of explanation. 
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versions of IBE for degrees of belief. However, I have not yet said much about why this is a bad 
consequence. 
 Consider probabilistic incoherence first. Philosophers disagree about whether rational credences 
must be diachronically coherent. However, most philosophers who work on the subject agree that 
rational credences must be synchronically coherent. The reasons for this perhaps differ from philosopher 
to philosopher (see section IV for one basis for synchronic coherence that does not extend to diachronic 
coherence). This is not the place to rehearse the various justifications commonly given for probabilistic 
coherence. It is enough to note that IBE* has so far been explored in contexts that take the need for 
synchronic coherence for granted. The papers by Douven, Schupbach, and Wenmackers cited at the 
beginning of section II all assume that credences updated by IBE* will be probabilities, and their 
discussions tend to take it for granted that this is a condition of an adequate update rule. For example, 
Douven and Wenmackers (forthcoming: 6) write that “we will want an update rule to be formally 
adequate, at least in that it outputs a probability function when given a probability function as input.” 
Thus, the argument of this paper shows that IBE* does not satisfy one of the criteria of adequacy 
assumed in most discussions of what form a credal version of IBE should take. Dialectically, then, it 
seems to show that IBE* is not the right way to spell out the slogan of IBE. 
 Consider deductive consistency next. It is more common for philosophers to give up this 
requirement in light of apparent counterexamples. Many philosophers have argued that because of the 
preface and lottery paradoxes, anyone who thinks that it is sometimes rational to believe propositions 
which are less than fully certain must accept that it is sometimes rational to believe propositions which 
are jointly inconsistent (see, e.g., Christensen 2004 and Easwaran and Fitelson 2015). In light of this, 
one might take my argument to simply give us another reason to give up deductive consistency as a 
requirement for rational belief. 
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 In response to this, I would make two points. First, my argument may still be effective for 
philosophers who believe that the preface and lottery paradoxes can be resolved in such a way that does 
not give up on deductive consistency as a requirement for full beliefs. These philosophers should agree 
that the fact that following the above versions of IBE sometimes leads to inconsistent beliefs gives us 
reason to reject these versions of IBE.
15
 
 Second, even if we can rationally have a large inconsistent set of beliefs, it remains plausible that 
it is never rational to believe two propositions which are inconsistent with each other. For example, 
Easwaran and Fitelson (2015: 83-84) write that “smaller inconsistent belief sets seem ‘less coherent’ 
than larger inconsistent belief sets,” and that only for inconsistent sets of size 2 is it completely clear that 
rationality precludes belief in all the members of the set. So if we are to retain IBE for full belief by 
                                                             
15 One might reply that we could borrow from these philosophers’ resolutions of the preface and lottery paradoxes to add a 
requirement to IBE for full belief that would rule out the kinds of inferences I discussed. For instance, if these philosophers 
think you shouldn’t hold lottery beliefs because they have property X, and the IBE-based beliefs in my cases have property 
X, then we can add to IBE the requirement that one not infer a conclusion that has property X. While I cannot consider all of 
the resolutions of the lottery and preface paradoxes that have been proposed here, I will note that at least some will not extend 
to my cases. For example, Nelkin (2000) tries to maintain deductive consistency in the face of the lottery paradox by arguing 
that rational belief cannot be based on purely statistical evidence, as one’s belief that one will lose a fair lottery is if one bases 
it purely on the number of tickets in the lottery. Rather, rational belief requires that one see an apparent “causal or 
explanatory connection between [one’s] belief and the fact that makes it true” (Nelkin 2000: 396). However, beliefs based on 
inference to the best explanation are the paradigm cases in which there is an apparent causal or explanatory connection 
between one’s belief and the fact that makes it true (cf. Nelkin 2000: 396n26). For instance, if you infer that U4 because you 
drew a black ball out of the urn and U4 posits the greatest number of black balls in the urn, then your belief is based on 
evidence that U4, if true, helped make true. Likewise, if the Jury infers that Plum is guilty because Boddy was killed with the 
revolver and Plum was more likely to use the revolver than Green, their belief is based on evidence that Plum’s being the 
murderer made true, if Plum is the murderer. 
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giving up on consistency, we should arguably adopt a version of IBE on which, in order for an 
explanation to count as good enough to infer, it must have a probability of at least .5. 
 This narrows down the versions of IBE to which my argument applies, but it is still an interesting 
result that we should reject versions of IBE for full belief that do not include or imply this threshold 
requirement. In addition, inasmuch as the argument of section II shows that the relevant probabilities for 
this requirement must be determined in a traditional Bayesian way
16
 rather than according to IBE* or 
some other non-Bayesian updating rule, this form of IBE will be, in some sense, a Bayesian version of 
IBE. My argument will then work against versions of IBE that are not Bayesian in this sense. 
   
IV. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have argued that non-Bayesian forms of IBE sometimes lead either to deductive 
inconsistency, in the case of IBE for full belief, or probabilistic incoherence, in the case of versions of 
IBE for degrees of belief that conflict with Bayesian conditionalization. They do so in situations where 
we are concerned with multiple levels of explanation, and the best explanations at different levels 
conflict with each other. Inasmuch as this phenomenon is both common and problematic, we should 
reject these forms of IBE as general rules for inference or updating. 
 In spite of the above arguments, I endorse the claim that explanatory considerations are central to 
good inference. Having argued against non-Bayesian forms of IBE, I want in this last section to briefly 
consider how explanatory factors could inform inference within a Bayesian framework.  
 First, note that even if we conclude from the above that we must reject any form of IBE that is 
inconsistent with Bayesian conditionalization, explanatory considerations could still be relevant to 
                                                             
16 But cf. section IV, where I suggest that explanatory factors do play a role in determining these probabilities, just not the 
kind of role embodied in a non-Bayesian updating rule. 
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confirmation inasmuch as, frequently, 
P(H|E&[there is an explanatory connection between E and H]) > P(H|E&[there is no explanatory 
connection between E and H]),  
as argued in Climenhaga forthcoming (contra Roche and Sober 2013). 
 But in fact I do not think the above arguments show that we should reject any form of IBE that is 
inconsistent with Bayesian conditionalization. This is because there are already good reasons to reject 
Bayes’ rule as a universal updating rule. As philosophers have long argued (e.g., Bacchus et al. 1990) 
there are many cases in which it is clear that we should not update by conditionalization: for example, 
when we start out with (what we now recognize to be) irrational credences. 
I endorse the traditional Bayesian objection to formulations of IBE for full belief that they do not 
take into account degrees of confidence or degrees of confirmation. However, given the above problems 
with conditionalization, my objection to IBE* is not the obvious Bayesian one that it violates 
conditionalization. Rather, I think that in a sense IBE* does not go far enough. IBE* (and the more 
general schema considered in section II) replaces a rule which is a complete function of one’s prior 
credence distribution with one that is a partial function of one’s prior credence distribution. Standard 
Bayesian conditionalization “inherits” the coherence of your past credence state: it keeps your credences 
in propositions at different levels of explanations coherent by preserving the coherent relations between 
them in your past credence function. By distorting these relations, IBE* leads to probabilistic 
incoherence. But making your current credences a function of your past credences is not the only way to 
get probabilistic coherence. Another way is to make them a function of the objective epistemic 
probabilities. 
Hence, in rejecting Bayes’ rule, I think we should go further than IBE*. We should give up on 
the idea that one’s current credences are in any way beholden to one’s past credences, and so give up on 
28 
 
rules for updating altogether. If you start out with irrational credences, no update rule will save you. You 
should base your current credence in H, not on the idiosyncratic opinions of your past self about H, but 
on the objective epistemic probability of H given your evidence. And, as Weisberg (2009) argues, it is 
here that explanatory factors can play an important role – in determining the correct a priori probability 
distribution. The correct explanationist alternative to Bayes’ rule is not a non-Bayesian updating or 
inference rule, but rather, an objective form of Bayesianism in which explanation plays a central role. 
Exploring that role is an important task for future research on IBE and Bayesianism.  
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